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Agricultural intensiﬁcationa b s t r a c t
Highland Ethiopia is one of the most densely populated regions of Africa and has long been associated
with both Malthusian disasters and Boserupian agricultural intensiﬁcation. This paper explores the race
between these two countervailing forces, with the goal of inform two important policy questions. First,
how do rural Ethiopians adapt to land constraints? And second, do land constraints signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
welfare outcomes in rural Ethiopia? To answer these questions we use a recent household survey of high-
potential areas. We ﬁrst show that farm sizes are generally very small in the Ethiopian highlands and
declining over time, with young rural households facing particularly severe land constraints. We then
ask whether smaller and declining farm sizes are inducing agricultural intensiﬁcation, and if so, how.
We ﬁnd strong evidence in favor of the Boserupian hypothesis that land-constrained villages typically
use signiﬁcantly more purchased input costs per hectare and more family labor, and achieve higher maize
and teff yields and higher gross income per hectare. However, although these higher inputs raise gross
revenue, we ﬁnd no substantial impact of greater land constraints on net farm income per hectare once
family labor costs are accounted for. Moreover, farm sizes are strongly positively correlated with net farm
income, suggesting that land constraints are an important cause of rural poverty. We conclude with some
broad policy implications of our results.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Introduction
Few countries in the world are more synonymous with starva-
tion and famine than Ethiopia. Highly agrarian and densely popu-
lated relative to its fragile natural resource base, Ethiopia appears
to be a modern embodiment of the Malthusian prediction that un-
checked fertility rates amid ﬁxed land and water resources will
lead to periodic famines (Malthus, 1798). While Malthus’s theory
remains highly relevant to modern Ethiopia, so too does Boserup’s
(1965) seminal work on agricultural intensiﬁcation in response to
land constraints. Ethiopia has a long history of agricultural intensi-
ﬁcation through the adoption of technologies that either econo-
mize on labor (the ox-plow), preserve natural resources (various
land structures, such as terracing, and the use of tree crops to pre-
serve soil integrity), or maximize value per hectare (Ethiopia is the
home of Arabica coffee). However, with very rapid population
growth in previous decades, it is also recognized that endogenoustechnological change may be inadequate and that policy-induced
responses to population growth are more important than ever.
The current government of Ethiopia therefore places a high priority
on agricultural development.1 To increase smallholder productivity,
the government has enacted ambitious plans to develop and extend
new seeds, chemical fertilizers, new crops, and new natural resource
management practices (including irrigation). It has also made sub-
stantial investment in roads and agricultural extension services
(Byerlee and Spielman, 2007; Dercon et al., 2009; Dorosh and Rashid,
2013) and enacted ambitious socioeconomic plans, such as reducing
rural fertility rates (Pörtner et al., 2012), providing universal primary
education, and developing secondary cities and towns (Government
of Ethiopia 2010). Observers are generally more critical of land man-
agement institutions. The government still formally owns and tightly
regulates the distribution and leasing of land, implicitly restricts
migration, and has promoted controversial smallholder resettlement
schemes and large commercial farms (Headey et al., 2014). These, though
Program
2 See http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P113032/agricultural-growth-pro-
gram?lang=en for more details.
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et al., 2007, 2011; Deininger et al., 2003), as well as migration (de
Brauw and Mueller, 2012) and the general demand for land-inten-
sive technologies (Binswanger and Pingali, 1988).
Yet despite the obvious importance of understanding adaption
to land constraints, the existing literature on Ethiopian agricultural
development has focused mostly on resource degradation, and that
too in fairly speciﬁc geographic areas. An edited book by Pender
et al. (2006) contains several similar studies, but with much great-
er focus on land degradation and land management. Kruseman
et al. (2006) use village-level data from 100 villages in Tigray,
while Pender and Gebremedhin (2006) use household – and vil-
lage-level data from the same survey for about 500 households.
That particular region of Tigray has lower agroecological potential
and poor access to sizable markets, meaning the results of these
studies are unlikely to be nationally representative. In the same
volume, Benin (2006) uses a survey conducted in 1999 and 2000
of 98 villages in the Amhara region, which contains a mix of high-
and low-potential villages. Overall, these studies ﬁnd mixed results
with respect to the Boserupian hypothesis. Kruseman et al. (2006)
and Pender and Gebremedhin (2006) ﬁnd positive effects of land
constraints on fertilizer use per hectare and labor per hectare,
but no impact on crop income per hectare. Benin ﬁnds that land
constraints lower the likelihood of using reduced tillage and lower
the value of crop yield per hectare in higher-density areas. While
insightful, these three studies have three limitations: (1) the data
are 13–14 years old, and much has changed in Ethiopia over this
time; (2) two of the studies pertain to Tigrayan areas of exception-
ally low agroecological potential and poor market access; and (3)
Benin (2006) focuses substantially on cereal yields rather than
one the more welfare-relevant indicator of total farm or total crop
income per hectare.
In this paper we instead adopt a broader geographic lens, pri-
marily making use of a large and recent household survey speciﬁ-
cally designed to speciﬁcally study agricultural intensiﬁcation (see
‘Data and methods’). The strength of our data is spatial richness, a
wide array of intensiﬁcation indicators, and a relatively large num-
ber of indicators of market access and agroecological potential,
both of which are vitally important control variables given their
joint association with farm sizes and intensiﬁcation outcomes.
However, our data are currently cross-sectional, thus precluding
the use of panel techniques. Moreover, our survey focuses on high-
er-potential areas. Ethiopia has small farms in lower-potential
areas as well, meaning that our results are unlikely to be nationally
representative, though they are representative of a large geo-
graphic area and a large farming population (about 13 million
people).
These data—as well as some insights from a literature review
and focus groups conducted in 12 villages—are used to explore
two interrelated objectives: First, we aim to understand the pat-
tern and evolution of farm sizes and land availability in Ethiopia
(‘The evolution of farming land and farm sizes in Ethiopia’). We
descriptively discuss the relative roles of agroecology, government
institutions, cultural norms, and demographic factors, and then
conduct a brief analysis of farm size patterns and evolution using
the Agricultural Growth Program Survey. Second, we aim to iden-
tify and quantify the drivers of agricultural intensiﬁcation (‘Agri-
cultural intensiﬁcation’). According to Boserup, farm sizes (at
both the individual and community levels) are likely to be a key
determinant of the demand for intensive technologies, such as
plows, chemical fertilizers, high-yielding seeds, and improved nat-
ural resource management practices. Yet Binswanger and col-
leagues also emphasize that access to input and output markets
is likely to be a commensurately important driver of agricultural
intensiﬁcation (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986; Pingali et al.,
1987; Pingali and Binswanger, 1988). The rapid development ofEthiopia’s road network, perhaps the fastest in Africa in recent dec-
ades (Dorosh and Rashid, 2013), suggests that this may be an
important factor. And of course, policy-induced intensiﬁcation,
particularly through the rapid expansion of Ethiopia’s agricultural
extension services (Davis et al., 2009), is another potentially
important driver of Agricultural intensiﬁcation.
It will come as no surprise to readers familiar with Ethiopia that
our concluding section (‘Conclusions’) yields nuanced ﬁndings in
response to the challenges posed in the previous sections. On the
one hand, we ﬁnd strong support for the Boserupian intensiﬁcation
hypothesis, especially with regard to very tight associations be-
tween land constraints and purchased input costs per hectare, farm
labor per hectare, cereal yields, and gross farm income. At the same
time, farm income per hectare net of these costs is not responsive
to rising land constraints, suggesting that land constraints impose
serious negative consequences for farm incomes, on average.
Moreover, we ﬁnd no evidence that land-constrained households
are more likely to engage in off-farm work or more likely to send
their children to school (suggesting income diversiﬁcation in the
future). Our concluding comments therefore offer some reﬂections
on Ethiopia’s rural development strategies in light of these impor-
tant ﬁndings.Data and methods
Data
As noted above, this study primarily makes use of a recent
household survey conducted in four main Ethiopian regions, the
Agricultural Growth Program Survey (AGPS). This survey is the
baseline for an intervention (the AGP) that seeks to provide tech-
nology, input, and marketing services to selected high-potential
woredas, with a goal toward promoting agricultural intensiﬁcation
on small farms.2 However, the AGPS also includes high-potential
non-AGP woredas, and although the survey is not representative of
the highlands (it excludes more drought-prone areas, for example),
it can be thought of as broadly representative of high-potential Ethi-
opian highlands. The survey also covers a large geographic area—93
of Ethiopia’s 450 highland woredas, with 304 enumeration areas
(EAs), which are essentially villages, with 28 households typically
surveyed in each village. Hence it provides very wide geographic
coverage, which is essential for providing the much-needed variation
in farming practices, farm sizes, and other factors of interest such as
market access, agroecological potential, and extension services
(most of these variables are measured at the EA level). Moreover,
since the AGP intervention is very much focused on producing inten-
siﬁcation and improved marketing outcomes, the survey contains a
wide array of high-quality indicators of agricultural intensiﬁcation.
The disadvantage is that it is not yet a panel survey, which
would allow us to control for household ﬁxed effects. For this rea-
son, our empirical approach aggregates beyond the household to
the EA or village level, under the assumption that unobserva-
bles—such as management skill—are netted out by this process
(more on this below).
Table 2.1 shows the key indicators of agricultural and nonagri-
cultural intensiﬁcation used in this study, as well as the explana-
tory variables used, which fall under several categories: land size
(household and EA levels), market access, agroecological controls,
and household indicators. Asterisks also note those indicators that
are measured at the EA/community level rather than the house-
hold level. As we will argue below, net farm income per capita is
arguably the key indicator of welfare-relevant agricultural intensi-
Table 2.1
Deﬁnitions of key indicators used in the study.
Variable name Deﬁnition/notes
Farm intensiﬁcation
Net and gross crop income per
hectare (ha)
Net income is less variable inputs. We calculate net income both with and without family labor costs. Family labor costs is the
number of man-days in recent seasons multiplied by the local wage rate. Gross crop income is not net of any costs
Net and gross farm income per
capita
As above, but we estimate total farm income (net and gross) and divide by the surveyed EA population
Total input cost per hectare DAP, urea, seeds, herbicides, pesticides, fungicides, tractor rental; this is measured without labor per ha
Fertilizer per hectare (kg) DAP and urea in previous belg and meher seasons
Improved seed per hectare (kg) Sum of basic and generation-one improved seeds
Plow equipment index PCA-generated index on ownership of six plow components
Handheld equipment index PCA-generated index on ownership of wide range of equipment
Daily wage rate, men Average of community-reported wages across different seasons
Maize yields Yields of maize (kg)
Teff yields Yields of teff (kg)
Nonfarm intensiﬁcation
Nonfarm work (yes = 1) Whether any HH member worked in nonfarm activities last year
Number of months off-farm work Months household members worked in off-farm activities
Secondary schooling Percentage of EA children aged 12–18 years that are in school
Farm sizes and distributions
EA cultivated area (ha) Average crop area cultivated at EA level
EA land inequality As above, but coefﬁcient of variation at EA level
Proportion of farm < 1 ha Proportion of farms in the EA that cultivate less than 1 ha
Institutions
Nearest market (km) Community estimates of distance (km) to nearest market town
Near 50 K city (min) GIS-based estimates of average travel time from EA to nearest 50 K city
Access to extension Dummy for whether there is a government extension ofﬁce in EA
Access to cooperative Dummy for whether there is a farmer cooperative in EA
Access to bank or MFI Dummy for whether this institution exists in EA
Access to savings and loans group Dummy for whether there is a savings and loans group in EA
Agroecology
LGP Length of growing period at subkebele level
Average slope Measured at average woreda level
Elevation Measured at average woreda level, used as dummy variables
Soil fertility (%) Subjective questions on soil quality: good, medium, poor
Land slopes (%) Subjective questions on shares of steep, hilly. and ﬂat land
Household controls
Household size Total number of household members
Men/women aged 15–60 Proxy for male and female labor force at household level
Household head’s sex (male = 1) Dummy indicating whether the head is male or female
Household head’s age Age of the household head in completed years
Household head’s education Primary, secondary, tertiary
Wealth index Principal components analysis on household assets
Notes: DAP is diammonium phosphate fertilizer. EA is enumeration area (or ‘‘village’’). GIS is geographic information systems data. MFI is microﬁnance institution.
PCA = principal components analysis. The ﬁrst principal component is used as an index. See Table A1 in the appendix for descriptive statistics for the intensiﬁcation and farm-
size variables.
4 To see this, note that farm output (Y ) per capita (N) net of input costs, Yf is the
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technological responses to changing land ratios. For nonfarm
intensiﬁcation, the AGP does not record nonfarm income per se
but does record nonfarm labor efforts in terms of months worked.
We also consider schooling access or investment as an important
dynamic response to limited farming opportunities, particularly
secondary education (primary education is becoming almost uni-
versal in highland Ethiopia). With respect to the variables, we mea-
sure farm size at both the household level and EA level average, as
well as EA level inequality. In addition to land pressures, agroeco-
logical factors are another extremely important set of control vari-
ables, particularly as agroecology could determine both population
density and intensiﬁcation outcomes. Fortunately, we have both
agroecological factors measured at the EA level from both the com-
munity questionnaire and from Geographic Information Systems
(GIS) data.3 Market access is another key driver of agricultural inten-
siﬁcation and is measured here in terms of access to market towns
and access to cities of at least 50,000 people. Farm policies and
institutions at the community are measured in terms of access to3 We thank Helina Tilahun and Mekamu Kedir for valuable research assistance with
the GIS data, which was collected and processed by the Central Statistical Agency in
conjunction with The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).cooperatives and other farmer groups. Finally, we also measure a
number of potentially relevant household characteristics, particu-
larly demographics, education, and wealth.
Models and methods
Since Malthus, small and shrinking farm sizes have long been
associated with agricultural crises and food insecurity. However,
Boserup (1965) and von Thünen (1826) showed that land con-
straints, improved access to markets, or both can create positive
pressures to intensify agricultural production, while in the modern
era scientiﬁc research outputs have demonstrated the potential
efﬁcacy of policy-induced intensiﬁcation (for example, the Green
Revolution). From a welfare point of view, the question is whether
intensiﬁcation of agricultural production is rapid enough to com-
pensate for reductions in farm sizes.4 A second question is where
this intensiﬁcation will come from. In Boserup’s theory, intensiﬁca-f N
product of agricultural output per unit of land (L) and land units per capita: YfN ¼
Yf
L  LN
or ln YfN ¼ ln
Yf
L þ ln LN in log terms. To maintain or increase farm output per capita,
intensiﬁcation (increased output per hectare) is therefore necessary if farm sizes are
shrinking.
6 One obvious source of intracluster correlation between errors is systematic
mistakes made by particular enumerators. Unfortunately, we cannot control for that
problem except through careful cleaning of the data.
7 To see this, suppose (arbitrarily) that measurement error is ±0.2 ha for farm sizes
in the entire sample. For a farm size of 5 ha, this is only a ±4% error. But for a farm size
of 0.5 ha, this is a ±40% error. Now suppose that we take an intensiﬁcation indicator
like total input cost per ha. If the true farm size is 0.5 ha but the reported farm size is
0.3 ha, the reported value of input costs per hectare is 67% larger than the true value.
Similarly, if the reported land area is 0.7 ha, the reported input costs per hectare are
just 28% of the true value. Of course, if small farmers over report farm sizes and larger
farmers underreport farm sizes, as the research by Beegle et al., 2012 suggests, then
we have an issue of measurement bias. One reason for this bias among small farmers
seems to be rounding (such as rounding up to 1 ha). In Ethiopia, the proliferation of
measurement scales for land sizes (most of which are much smaller than a hectare)
may mean this problem is not substantial.
8 Speciﬁcally, we use the qreg and rreg commands in STATA. Note that LAD
regressions are sometimes called least absolute value (LAV or MAD) models. rreg
iteratively downweights outliers. Also note that other estimation frameworks could
be considered in this kind of work—particularly seemingly unrelated regressions and
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and others are more explicit in noting the inﬂuence of access to
markets (M), agroecological potential (A), farm policies (P), and other
local characteristics (X) on agricultural intensiﬁcation. Thus, a more
general theory of farm intensiﬁcation speciﬁes intensiﬁcation
indicators as a function of all of these factors. And since our focus
is on village-level factors, we typically use village-level means or
proportions (signiﬁed by the bars above each variable), yielding
functions of the following form:
Yf
L
¼ f ðL;M;A; P;XÞ; ð1Þ
where YfL is an intensiﬁcation indicator (such as farm output, Y, per
hectare, L). The elasticity with respect to land constraints LN
 
in-
forms us of the magnitude of Boserupian intensiﬁcation, controlling
for the other drivers of intensiﬁcation listed above.
Several important issues arise in estimating Eq. (1). First, Bos-
erup’s theory pertains to adaptation to a latent variable—land pres-
sures. Strictly speaking, the most ideal measure of land constraints
would be potential agricultural land per capita, where potential in-
cludes land not currently used but potentially cultivable.5 In the
absence of this more ideal indicator, researchers often measure ‘‘land
pressures’’ as population density (that is, population per area of total
land). However, using population density means several disadvan-
tages, particularly in the Ethiopian context.
First, potential land may be a function of institutional factors. In
Ethiopia, land is allocated to farmers by the state, and outside of
renting land, most smallholders cannot obtain more land except
through resettlement and migration or—wealth permitting—
registering as a commercial farmer. For most peasants in the
highlands, therefore, signiﬁcant land expansion within their local
area is rarely possible.
Second, when population density is deﬁned with respect to total
land, as it is in practice, areas that actually have little or no agricul-
tural potential may be included, such as mountainous areas (a very
relevant issue in Ethiopia) or areas of insufﬁcient rainfall or soil
quality.
Third, a practical measurement issue is that the GIS variables
used to measure population density at disaggregated spatial units
(that is, the EA level) are actually interpolated from much more
aggregated and infrequent census data, with little ‘‘ground tru-
thing’’ to verify on the ground the data that are collected. It is
therefore not a priori clear that GIS-based indicators measure local
population density with sufﬁcient accuracy.
Our approach is instead to primarily rely on cultivated land per
capita at the EA level as our proxy for land pressures. This measure
does not rely on interpolation and is still likely to be a good proxy
for our latent variable of interest, land constraints. As a variant of
this, we also use the percentage of households in a village cultivat-
ing less than 1 hectare (ha) of land. While the one-hectare thresh-
old is somewhat arbitrary, it is worth noting that most Ethiopian
households with several farm workers and an ox-plow can easily
cultivate more than 1 ha. In other words, all but the most labor-
or power-constrained households would not normally choose to
cultivate less than 1 ha. Thus, the prevalence of farms smaller than
1 ha is highly likely to represent a land constraint.
A second estimation issue pertains to unobservables. By mea-
suring all variables at the EA level we will likely be purging the
regressions of many household unobservables that are normally
distributed within a given village (for example, farmer manage-
ment abilities, mental attitudes, or health variables). Moreover,
it is also possible that taking EA (cluster)-level averages will5 Potential is a fuzzy concept, however, since it is presumably economic potential
that matters, which is a continuous rather than dichotomous variable.reduce measurement error, provided that intracluster household
errors are independent.6 However, without a panel we may still
have a potential problem of village unobservables. A particular
concern with Boserup’s hypothesis is that both agricultural inten-
siﬁcation and land pressures are heavily inﬂuenced by agroecolog-
ical potential, access to markets, and institutional factors (see Eq.
(1) above). While institutional factors are, to a fair extent, coun-
try- or regionwide (for example, state ownership of land or
restrictions on migration), agroecological potential and market ac-
cess vary substantially, even throughout the highlands. This im-
plies that if these two factors are not sufﬁciently well speciﬁed
in the model, the positive correlation between these factors and
farm sizes will lead to an upward bias on the coefﬁcient on farm
sizes in our intensiﬁcation regression (that is, part of the impact of
farm sizes on intensiﬁcation should in fact be attributed to these
other factors). As we noted above, we essentially address this
problem through the best possible measurement: We have six
indicators of agricultural potential, two indicators of market ac-
cess, and multiple indicators of institutional access to inputs (such
as cooperatives and extension services). While we cannot guaran-
tee that this set of indicators fully observes all the latent factors of
interest, we are conﬁdent that we have at least minimized omit-
ted variable biases as best we can. Nevertheless, we still acknowl-
edge that our estimates need to be interpreted carefully.
Finally, measurement errors will be an important problem in
estimating Eq. (1). Since most intensiﬁcation variables are mea-
sured in per hectare terms (for example, fertilizer per hectare)
any under- or overestimation of farm size is likely to amplify
measurement errors at smaller farm sizes (Beegle et al., 2012).7
Hence misreporting of farm size ampliﬁes per hectare measure-
ment error at very small farm sizes when the dependent variable
is measured in per hectare terms. We have taken several steps to
reduce this problem. First, by averaging values to the EA level, we
may reduce some of the noise in these intensiﬁcation indicators.
Second, we have excluded several EAs for which measurement er-
rors appeared to be a problem. Third, we ran sensitivity tests
using two robust regressors that downweight outlying values,
which are reported in the working paper version of this article
(Headey et al., 2013).8 We also note that in most of our regres-
sions we use seemingly unrelated regressions to generate more
efﬁcient estimates. This may be particularly important if unob-
served shocks affect multiple intensiﬁcation outcomes (for exam-
ple, local rainfall patterns).clustered standard error approaches—but these frameworks address only efﬁciency
issues (that is, they affect standard errors). In the presence of outliers, they will still
yield coefﬁcients that are not representative of the central tendencies of key
relationships.
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The pattern and evolution of farming land and farm sizes are
primarily driven by agroecological potential and access to market
(or infrastructure), as well as institutions of land management
and migration. In this section we aim to brieﬂy describe the pre-
vailing agroecology and the institutional environment in the Ethi-
opian highlands.
Agroecological drivers of rural settlement patterns
Ethiopia has always been and still remains a highly agrarian
country, with rural settlement patterns strongly determined by
agroecological factors. Fig. 3.1 demonstrates this by mapping out
district (woreda)-level population density data from the 2007 cen-
sus. The darker, high-density areas of Fig. 3.1 almost perfectly
overlap with the Ethiopian highlands, while the lower-density,
lightly colored areas constitute the Ethiopian lowlands. Despite
occupying only around a quarter of total land area, the highlands
contain approximately four-ﬁfths of the population and have a
long history of sedentary agriculture based on relatively good soils;
reasonably high (but variable) rainfall; and a relatively low inci-
dence of tropical pests and associated diseases, such as malaria
from the mosquito and nagana from the tsetse ﬂy, which also en-
abled the adoption of the plow.
Yet even with the highlands there is tremendous agroecological
and livelihood diversity. The southwest highlands (mostly in
Oromia and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Regions)
have relatively good potential and contain large areas in which
population density exceeds 200 people per square kilometer. A
few zones in this area have densities of 300–500 people, which isFig. 3.1. Agricultural Growth Program enumeration areas (dark circles), major marke
categories (in population per square kilometer) from lightest to darkest are 0–31, 32–101
(in population per square kilometer) from lightest to darkest are 0–31, 32–101, 102–1
ethiopia. Market towns (light circles) are from FEWSNET, and population density at thecomparable to Rwanda. Mean farm sizes are well below 1 ha. The
central and western highlands (parts of Oromia, much of Amhara,
and Tigray) also have relatively high rainfall and good agroecolog-
ical potential for the most part. Population densities typically vary
between 100 and 200 people per square kilometer, and farm sizes
are over 1 ha on average. Western Tigray and northern Amhara
have areas that are somewhat unusual, with larger farms and sub-
stantial specialization in sesame seed production. The eastern
highlands toward Dire Dawa, Harar, and Jijiga vary between low
to medium rainfall but still have reasonable agroecological poten-
tial in many areas, with a mix of staple cereals (maize, sorghum),
high-value crops (coffee, chat), and high-value livestock produc-
tion (including live animal exports to the Middle East). Parts of
these eastern highlands are high density, small-farm environ-
ments. Finally, eastern Tigray and northeastern Amhara are often
considered drought-prone highland areas. As we noted above, pre-
vious work on Boserupian intensiﬁcation focused on these areas,
whereas such areas are excluded from the AGP.
In addition to density patterns, several other descriptive points
are noteworthy. First, while there is very limited scope to expand
agricultural area in the highlands, Ethiopia is still relatively land
abundant in purely agroecological terms, largely because of the
underpopulated, high-rainfall western lowlands, as well as some
substantial irrigation potential in otherwise arid lowland areas.
However, from an economic rather than an agroecological perspec-
tive, whether the lowlands offer signiﬁcant opportunities for the
expansion of smallholder farming is quite unclear. Parts of the
western lowlands have substantial rains, but also signiﬁcant soil
constraints and a higher incidence of malaria, tsetse ﬂy, and other
tropical pests and diseases, which have inhibited sedentary
plow-based crop farming and the efﬁcacy of resettlement schemests (light circles), and woreda-level population density. Notes: Population density
, 102–139, 140–195, 196–537, 538 and above. Notes: Population density categories
39, 140–195, 196–537, 538 and above. Source: http://www.gafspfund.org/content/
woreda level is from the 2007 National Census of Ethiopia.
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Binswanger, 1993; Tereke, 2007). One important exception is the
informal smallholder settlement of western Tigray and northwest-
ern Amhara, which has been quite a striking phenomenon in recent
decades. The Borena plateau (southern Ethiopia in Oromia region)
is better suited to livestock rearing than to smallholder crop sys-
tems. The Somali (south and east) and Afar (northeast) have sizable
irrigation potential but also major constraints to exploiting this po-
tential, including inter-regional migration restrictions and poor
infrastructure (Headey et al., 2014). In addition to smallholder set-
tlement of these areas, numbers cited in Headey et al. (2014) show
that (speculative) data on large farms in lowland areas suggest
these lowland areas do have sizable potential for creating jobs, par-
ticularly seasonal jobs.9 But with the exception of seasonal employ-
ment generation, land expansion in the lowlands will most likely do
little to alleviate land pressures in the highlands.12 Although some scathing critiques have been reported of recent resettlement
programs (Hammond, 2008; Tereke, 2007), few if any rigorous evaluations exist.
Nevertheless, the Ethiopian government had budgeted for US$100 per capita in its
2002 resettlement plans. It is difﬁcult to imagine that this amounts to sufﬁcientInstitutional drivers of farm-size evolution
Ethiopia’s historical and current land institutions are enor-
mously complex, and frankly it is impossible to do justice to this
complexity here. Table 3.1 instead summarizes the prevalent insti-
tutions in the current era (the 21st century), while the text brieﬂy
emphasizes the central points. Unlike many African countries, Ethi-
opia had no signiﬁcant history of colonial land institutions. Up un-
til 1974, Ethiopia had a highly unequal feudal land system, with
the vast majority of the population operating as serfs for absentee
landlords. This inequality was a major cause of the overthrow of
the imperial regime in 1974 by the Communist Derg regime, which
maintained power over most of the country until around 1990.
Immediately after taking power, the Derg implemented a land re-
form proclamation in February 1975. This proclamation produced
several radical changes (Deininger et al., 2007, 2003; Gebreselassie,
2011; Kebede, 2007). Ofﬁcially, all land came under the ownership
of the state but was given to farmers on use-right (usufruct) basis,
and commercial large-scale farms were turned into state farms.
Peasant associations were set up to redistribute land to farmers liv-
ing in their jurisdiction, largely according to family size.10 Another
important aspect of the communist period were explicit and implicit
restrictions on migration (such as the ‘‘use it or lose it’’ policy).
When the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) defeated the
Derg regime in the early 1990s, they engaged in a partial liberaliza-
tion of the agricultural sector, as well as land redistributions in Ti-
gray and Amhara, partly along the lines of political allegiance (Ege,
1997). After the 1995 constitution was drafted, land management
institutions devolved to the regions, albeit under reasonably inﬂex-
ible federal laws. Apart from some modest redistributions, post-
1995 land reforms have been marginal rather than radical. Land
is still owned by the state, migration still faces explicit and implicit
restrictions, and even the introduction of land rental markets in-
volves size restrictions.11 Admittedly, some variation exists be-
tween regions in the implementation of these laws, though for the
most part these differences seem marginal.9 In our focus group interviews we also heard that seasonal migration to irrigated
farms in the Awash Valley was particularly important in parts of SNNP, such as Gara
Godo. In that village, the interviewees claimed that every household in the village
with a viable worker engaged in seasonal migration in the last harvest season. They
also emphasized that this was hugely important in welfare terms, given the late and
rather poor rains in recent years.
10 However, Kebede (2007) ﬁnds evidence suggesting that imperial land distribution
persisted to some extent into the Derg era. Nevertheless, on aggregate, land inequality
is reasonably low in Ethiopia, but not as low as in some other socialist countries.
11 As of 2011–2012, statistics suggest that just 12 percent of cultivated land is
rented (CSA, 2012). Yet this ﬁgure in itself masks huge regional differences: The two
largest regions, Oromia and SNNP, have rental rates of 8.7% and 5.7%, respectively,
while Tigray and Amhara have rates of 19.5% and 17.9%, respectively (CSA, 2012).Finally, with rapid population growth, it is also worth consider-
ing how young people obtain land. Intrafamily inheritance of land is
legally permissible (including intrafamily donations when parents
are still living), but with high rates of fertility, younger generations
will generally inherit much smaller farms than their parents did,
even with some outmigration. Regional governments also guaran-
tee access to land for all regional residents, provided they meet
minimum farm-size laws. Many villages, however, do not have en-
ough land to meet the requirements of younger generations, and
whether the ofﬁcial land-size requirements are strictly enforced is
unclear. Certainly, many datasets—including our own—show a high
prevalence of very small farms (see below). An alternative does ex-
ist in the form of resettlement schemes (in 2002, the government
stated that it planned to resettle 2.2 million voluntary migrants),
but these are generally unattractive for most rural people because
of malaria, vastly different agroecological conditions, poor infra-
structure, and inadequate public support.12 The alternative is migra-
tion to small towns, to cities, or to work overseas.Trends and patterns of farm size distribution
We conclude this section by reporting some important statistics
on farm size distributions in the main highland regions. The top pa-
nel of Table 3.2 shows nationally representative statistics from the
2011–2012 Agricultural Sample Survey of the Central Statistical
Agency (CSA), while the bottom panel shows analogous statistics
from the AGP Survey (AGPS). As predicted by the population den-
sity data in Fig. 3.1, average farm sizes in Ethiopia are very small by
international standards, at 0.96 ha per holding, and correlate clo-
sely with population density.13 The national average is raised by lar-
ger farm sizes in the most populous region of Oromia (1.15 ha) and
in Amhara (1.09 ha), but lowered by much smaller farm sizes in the
densely populated SNNP Region (just 0.49 ha). Tigray also has rela-
tively small farms but is much less populous than the other three
regions. Although variation is marked in average farm sizes, Gini
coefﬁcients of inequality do not vary greatly across regions and
generally fall between 0.41 and 0.44 in the four highland regions.14
Table 3.2 also shows statistics on the number of very small farms,
deﬁned as the percentage of holdings of less than 0.5 ha. Some
62% of SNNP farmholdings are less than 0.5 ha, a ﬁgure double the
levels observed in Oromia and Amhara.
The AGPS statistics on cultivated area (rather than holdings) at
the bottom of Table 3.2 show a broadly similar pattern across re-
gions, with the exception of Tigray, where the AGPS indicates much
larger farms than does the CSA data for Tigray. This is as expected,
since the AGPS oversamples the land-abundant areas of western
Tigray, home to a number of large sesame farms in particular. Even
so, large proportions of farmers cultivate less than 0.5 ha in thesupport. Moreover, no evidence to date exists showing that anywhere near 2.2 million
people have thus far been resettled. In our focus group interviews, respondents in
high-density areas thought that resettlement was a good idea in principle, but the
challenges were typically too immense to make such schemes attractive enough to
young farmers.
13 Farm size refers to crop area per holding. In Ethiopia substantial amounts of
grazing land are communal, so it is not obvious that including this is appropriate.
Moreover, our interest is primarily in the crop or mixed crop–livestock systems,
rather than in the livestock sector per se (especially since much of the specialized
livestock sector exists in low-density lowland areas (pastoralist or agropastoralist).
14 This is relatively low by international standards, and at the lower bound of the
range of results reported by Kebede (2007) for the nonnationally representative
Ethiopian Rural Household Survey villages. And while these land inequality coefﬁ-
cients are higher than expected in a socialist land system, we note that Ethiopia’s
level of land inequality is almost exactly the same as Vietnam’s.
Table 3.1
Overview of current legal land tenure regime in Ethiopia. Source: Zewdu and Malek, 2013.
Aspect of land tenure Federal State
Acquisition of land
Ways to acquire land – Distribution, redistribution, donation, inheritance, lease or rent – Not regulated by state
Time limit – Only investors have a time limit – Not regulated by state
Size limit – Farm plots must be at least a certain size – States and regions decide the minimum size
Residency – No residency requirement – Must be a rural resident of region to receive land for
free
Regional differences – ‘‘Rural’’ residency requirement more relaxed in
Amhara
Transfers
Permissible transfers – Inheritance, donation to family, rent/lease to farmers – Not regulated by state
Rent/lease restrictions – Only to other farmers or investors (rural or urban) willing to engage in
agriculture and for a ﬁxed period
– States decide on time limit for rent or lease, and size of
plot (varies); some states stipulate permissible use of
rented land
Inheritance restrictions – Inheritor must be regional resident, willing to engage in agriculture, and
minimum size requirement must be enforced; in case of divorce, the
landholder cannot transfer land if he or she earns more than the minimum
salary of government employee; other than divorce, inheritance only applies
upon death of landholder
– Minimum plot size is dictated by irrigation status
– Rural residency requirement varies at state level for
inheritance
Donation restrictions – Recipient must be regional resident and family member willing to engage in
agriculture
– Rural residency requirement varies at state level for
donation
Redistribution and consolidation
Criteria – Community agreement, except for irrigable land – Not regulated by state
Size requirement – Redistributed land must meet minimum size requirement – States determine minimum size
Consolidation – Land consolidation is ‘‘encouraged’’
Loss of landholding rights: results from failure to use and protect the land
Criteria – Federal provision exists for loss of land rights due to nonuse or lack of
protection; states decide the conditions
– States determine the speciﬁc conditions
– Leaving land unused 1–3 years (varies)
– Nonfarming activity or income
Table 3.2
Farm distribution by major highland regions, 2011–2012. Source: Authors’ calculations from CSA, 2012 and AGPS data.
Oromia SNNP Amhara Tigray Ethiopia
Panel A—Nationally representative statistics from Central Statistical Agency (2012)
Average farm size (ha) 1.15 0.49 1.09 0.91 0.96
Farm size inequality (Gini, 0–1) 0.43 0.44 0.41 0.43 0.46
% with less than 0.5 ha 30.0 61.7 33.4 41.4 39.7
Total number of holders (millions) 5.46 3.39 4.00 0.96 14.29
Panel B—AGPS Statistics
Variables/region Oromia SNNP Amhara Tigray All AGP
Average cultivated area (ha) 1.32 0.93 1.37 1.56 1.46
% with less than 0.5 ha 18 35 22 17 23
Number of holdersa 4.15 2.38 2.54 0.28 9.36
ha = hectare.
a The number of holders refers to the estimated number of holders in the population upon which the AGPS is based.
15 Note that after age 60 the gradient turns negative, presumably because older
farmers give away land to their children. For this reason, however, we do not report
the results for older populations.
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SNNP. Fig. 3.2 shows a histogram of average cultivated area per
hectare at the EA level for the 304 AGPS villages analyzed in this
study. While admittedly not controlling for the agroecological po-
tential of the land, Fig. 3.2 nevertheless suggests substantial varia-
tion in average farm sizes across the highlands, though the bulk of
the sample lies between 0.5 and 2 ha. We also note a few outliers
in terms of EAs with very large farms.
While Table 3.1 and Fig. 3.2 offer interesting snapshots of farm
size distributions across highland Ethiopia, they say little about
evolution. Nationally, we know that average farm sizes declined
from an estimated 1.4 ha per holding in the 1977 agricultural cen-
sus to around 1.0 ha in the 2001/2002 census. Since the 2001/2002,
the annual Agricultural Sample Survey data from the CSA have
actually shown a slight increase in average farmholdings. Given
that this result is somewhat surprising in light of continued rural
population growth, we examine the issue from another angle by
linking farm size to age of the household head using the AGPS.
Our expectation is that if land is indeed a constraint, younger peo-
ple will have much smaller farms than their elders. However, sinceage of the household head could be correlated with confounding
factors, netting such factors out as much as possible is also clearly
important. In particular, younger farmers may have less land be-
cause of smaller family size (a criterion in government land alloca-
tion) or insufﬁcient wealth to rent more land. Hence we ﬁrst
regress household cultivated area against community variables
(EA farm size, agroecological potential, market access) and house-
hold variables (wealth, education, and family size), and then use
the residuals as an indicator of farm sizes net of confounding fac-
tors. The results of that regression are reported in the appendix,
with all the variables listed above having sizable and signiﬁcant
explanatory power, and an R-squared of 52%. Lowess predictions
of the raw farm size data and the residuals of average farm size
per holder (standardized to the sample mean) are plotted against
the age of male household heads from 25 to 60 years (Fig. 3.3).15











0 1 2 3 4 5
Average EA cultivated land (in ha) per holder
Fig. 3.2. A histogram of average cultivated land per capita at the enumeration area
level. Source: Authors’ estimates from AGPS data.
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Fig. 3.3. Younger farmers have much smaller farm sizes than older cohorts. Notes:
Residuals of farmholdings are the residuals of a regression of household farmhold-
ings, average EA farm size, agroecological factors, market access, household wealth,
education of the household head, and household family size. This regression is
reported in the appendix. Source: Authors’ calculations from AGPS data
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steep negative gradients between the two farm size indicators
and the age of the household head, though the gradient is ﬂatter
after the confounding factors are netted out. But even with the
farm size indicator net of confounding factors, the difference in
farm sizes is signiﬁcant. Farmers below the age of 38 have farm
sizes that are almost 0.2 ha smaller than farmers aged 50 years
and about 0.3 hectare smaller than those aged 60 years. Of course,
it is possible that these younger farmers will inherit more land as
they get older, suggesting that some of the age–farmland gap ob-
served in Fig. 3.3 simply pertains to life cycle factors that cannot
be observed in a one-off snapshot. On the other hand, the graph
may underestimate land pressures insofar as it does not factor in
landlessness, since younger landless households are not included
in the sample. Certainly in the focus group discussions in the more
densely populated areas of SNNP and Oromia, we heard some sub-
stantial discussion of young people not being able to obtain sufﬁ-
cient land, consistent with the farm size statistics reported in
Table 3.2 and Fig. 3.2. For many young rural Ethiopians, then, land
appears to be a major constraint.Agricultural intensiﬁcation
In this section we focus on the relationships between land con-
straints and agricultural intensiﬁcation, as well as other drivers of
intensiﬁcation. Virtually all of our dependent variables are mea-
sured in per hectare terms, except for the two equipment indexes
(plow and handheld), wages, and farm income per capita and a
wealth–asset index (which are welfare measures rather than inten-
siﬁcation measures). Also note that for the sake of brevity and be-
cause they are strictly exogenous variables of limited policy
interest, agroecological controls (altitude, length of the growing
period, sloping land, and soil) are not reported. However, the full
results reported in the Appendix show that these indicators are
more often than not individually signiﬁcant and invariably jointly
signiﬁcant, which provides some assurance that the potentially
confounding relationship between land pressures and agroecolog-
ical potential is controlled for to a substantial extent.
Turning to the results of primary interest, Table 4.1 reports re-
sults for various nonlabor farm inputs; Table 4.2 reports results for
wages, family labor, hired labor, and maize and teff yields; and Ta-
ble 4.3 focuses on some of the more welfare-relevant variables,
such as farm income per hectare, farm income per capita, and aver-
age household wealth index scores. Note that although all regres-
sions are linear, we also report elasticities of the intensiﬁcation
variables with respect to average farm size at the bottom of each
table. Being scale neutral, these elasticities facilitate comparisons
across different intensiﬁcation indicators.
Starting with Table 4.1, in the ﬁrst regression we observe a large
and signiﬁcant marginal effect of average farm sizes on fertilizers.
A one-hectare increase in average farm size decreases fertilizer use
by about 11 kilograms (kg) on average, with an elasticity of 0.82.
Land inequality possesses a negative association with fertilizer use,
as one might expect. Also of note is that the market access vari-
ables are important determinants of fertilizer use. An extra
10 km to a local market reduces fertilizer use by about 1.8 kg/hect-
are. Education and wealth are also positively correlated with fertil-
izer use, but the marginal effects are not very precise.
We ﬁnd a similar pattern of results with respect to improved
seed use in regression 2, with an even higher elasticity, along with
higher standard errors as well. In regression 3 we regress all
nonlabor variable input expenditures (in birr), which includes
fertilizers, seeds, pesticides, and other chemicals. Consistent with
the results for fertilizers and seeds, we ﬁnd a large negative
marginal effect of about 480 birr/hectare, or just under US$30
per hectare, with an elasticity of 0.88. Wealth and secondary
education are other important determinants of expenditures on
variable.
In the last two regressions of Table 4.1 show indexes of the
ownership of plow equipment and handheld equipment (hoes,
sickles, picks, axes, and so on). We had mixed expectations with re-
gard to these indicators, particularly plow equipment. The plow
has played an important part in substituting for labor in Ethiopia,
particularly in the production of teff, which requires greater land
preparation than other crops. On the other hand, the plow is
important for land expansion as well as intensiﬁcation, while feed
constraints at higher population densities can also limit the use of
the plow. Consistent with that ambiguity, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant po-
sitive relationship between farm size and plow equipment, though
the effect is small and only marginally signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
However, we note that the vast majority of households in our sam-
ple own at least one bovine that could potentially be used for
plowing. Since plow equipment or animals can be borrowed or
rented, we would not expect much relationship between land con-
straints and plow equipment. Handheld equipment also holds no
relationship to average farm size, although farmland inequality
Table 4.1
SUR regressions of farm inputs with respect to average farm sizes and other determinants of intensiﬁcation.








EA average farm size (ha) 11.166*** 2.016*** 481.422*** 0.166* 0.015
(1.974) (0.506) (81.54) (0.097) (0.046)
EA farm coefﬁcient variation 8.478*** 1.900* 41.489 0.510*** 0.248**
(3.175) (1.014) (161.74) (0.163) (0.124)
Nearest market (km) 0.188** 0.01 6.21 0.007 0.010
(0.091) (0.03) (5.13) (0.005) (0.003)
Nearest city (minutes) 0.572 0.24 9.729 0.064*** 0.011
(0.446) (0.15) (17.56) (0.022) (0.014)
Extension ofﬁce = 1 2.924 0.45 154.376 0.193 0.096
(2.543) (0.71) (108.53) (0.145) (0.091)
Savings credit co-op = 1 1.991 0.05 117.15 0.019 0.015
(2.522) (0.69) (96.522) (0.109) (0.074)
Savings and loan = 1 2.344 0.34 79.757 0.274** 0.174**
(2.50) (0.89) (100.674) (0.119) (0.081)
Bank/MFI = 1 1.25) 0.882 62.459 0.248 0.301
(5.114 (1.71) (134.263) (0.337) (0.186)
HH heads with sec. educ. (0–1) 76.542*** 32.426*** 3,205.614** 0.687 2.407**
(29.29) (12.01) (1,433.02) (1.525) (1.022)
HH heads with ter. educ. (0–1) 247.147 28.333 6,607.79 11.052 1.919
(286.40) (35.71) (12,675.7) (11.49) (3.558)
EA average wealth (SD) 1.798 1.403 137.345** 0.003 0.111**
(1.36) (1.14) (54.076) (0.067) (0.052)
No. of villages (N) 282 281 277 286 286
R-squared 0.44 0.24 0.42 0.65 0.36
Farm size elasticity 0.82 1.85 0.88 0.61 Not signiﬁcant
Notes: The regressions also included agroecological controls for altitude, length of the growing period, soil quality, and slope. See Table 2.1 for deﬁnitions of variables and
Headey et al. (2013) for full results.
Standard errors are in parenthesis. The farm size elasticity at the bottom of this table is calculated at the medians of the dependent and independent variables. ha = hectare.
MFI = microﬁnance institution.
* Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% levels.
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% levels.
Table 4.2
SUR regressions of wages, labor inputs, and cereal yields with respect to farm sizes and other determinants of intensiﬁcation.








EA average farm size (ha) 1.51 0.03* 40.01*** 334.84*** 562.76***
(0.94) (0.02) (6.03) (78.93) (117.76)
EA farm coef. of variation 1.41 0.051 31.83** 118.91 91.09
(1.78) (0.03) (13.413) (91.07) (140.24)
Nearest market (km) 0.05 0.01 0.14 0.38 1.44
(0.05) (0.00) (0.317) (2.674) (5.25)
Nearest city (minutes) 0.28 0.01 1.98 11.57 9.75
(0.24) (0.00) (1.559) (14.26) (20.74)
Extension ofﬁce = 1 0.92 0.019 18.23* 187.09** 31.21
(1.44) (0.03) (10.359) (78.01) (121.21)
Savings credit co-op = 1 1.24 0.083*** 12.011 88.65 162.29
(1.18) (0.03) (8.067) (82.08) (115.57)
Savings and loan = 1 1.72 0.04 24.07*** 5.056 4.13
(1.29) (0.03) (8.032) (88.98) (115.62)
Bank/MFI = 1 0.32 0.02 67.53*** 43.11 167.34
(3.47) (0.07 (17.25) (155.60) (225.96)
HH heads with sec. educ. (0–1) 1.76 0.66 58.4 550.6 4,724.9***
(16.88) (0.43) (117.9) (1,116.1) (1,477.7)
HH heads with ter. educ. (0–1) 123.30*** 0.96 355.5 10,040.1*** 6,288.7**
(47.20) (4.05) (713.8) (2,484.6) (3,133.9)
EA average wealth (SD) 1.481* 0.06** 6.97 34.50 90.92
(0.84) (0.02) (4.42) (40.147) (68.91)
No. of villages (N) 267 267 266 267 267
R-squared 0.32 0.29 0.44 0.35 0.39
Farm size elasticity Not signiﬁcant 0.00 0.41 0.53 0.54
Notes: The regressions also included agroecological controls for altitude, length of the growing period, soil quality, and slope. See Table 2.1 for deﬁnitions of variables and
Headey et al. (2013) for full results.
Standard errors are in parenthesis. The farm size elasticity at the bottom of this table is calculated at the medians of the dependent and independent variables.
* Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% levels.
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% levels.
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Table 4.3
SUR regressions of income and wealth variables with respect to farm sizes and other determinants of intensiﬁcation. Source: Authors’ calculations from AGPS data.
Dependent variable Net crop income per hectare
(birr), after excluding labor








EA average farm size (ha) 4,215.9*** 681.7 757.7*** 1,028.9*** 0.12*
(744.1) (544.7) (210.8) (218.6) (0.06)
EA farm coef. of variation 243.3 360.2 579.5* 681.8* 0.18
(1,468.7) (1,711.4) (334.4) (373.0) (0.14)
Nearest market (km) 3.06 55.7 4.5 11.5 0.01**
(57.9) (36.8) (10.8) (13.3) (0.00)
Nearest city (minutes) 293.7* 119.1 29.9 3.4 0.01
(161.3) (153.1) (47.8) (45.4) (0.02)
Extension ofﬁce = 1 543.10 554.6 217.7 341.7 0.13
(1,326.1) (1,420.4) (315.8) (326.9) (0.13)
Savings credit co-op = 1 865.2 489.3 633.3*** 599.1** 0.12
(952.1) (1,001.3) (233.0) (233.3) (0.12)
Savings and loan = 1 324.4 460.5 82.4 131.4 0.19
(843.3) (861.5) (242.1) (234.2) (0.14)
Bank/MFI = 1 1,137.0 2,796.8 103.8 320.2 0.17
(1,656.6) (2,141.5) (555.5) (597.7) (0.24)
HH heads with sec. educ. (0–1) 11,406.7 761.2 922.4 1,510.7 3.55***
(12,297.1) (11,570.3) (2,600.6) (2,635.1) (1.28)
HH heads with ter. educ. (0–1) 80,905.5 81,412.2 20,240.9 11,782.5 7.59
(107,000.0) (134,000.0) (31,168.9) (32,653.5) (12.61)
EA average wealth (std. dev.) 857.424* 271.4 314.0** 120.8
(501.7) (421.1) (137.8) (128.0)
No. of villages (N) 268 267 268 268 268
R-squared 0.26 0.20 0.32 0.36 0.24
Farm size elasticity 0.54 Not signiﬁcant 0.09 0.84 0.06
Notes: The regressions also included agroecological controls for altitude, length of the growing period, soil quality, and slope. See Table 2.1 for deﬁnitions of variables, and
Headey et al. (2013) for full results.
Standard errors are in parenthesis. The farm size elasticity at the bottom of this table is calculated at the medians of the dependent and independent variables.
* Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% levels.
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% levels.
16 Note that we also regressed an indicator of off-farm work and secondary school
enrollment against the covariates used in Tables 4.1–4.3. We found no impact of land
endowments on either indicator. From a dynamic welfare perspective, these results
are not encouraging, but they are also not surprising. Secondary school enrollment is
still very low in Ethiopia (though expanding rapidly), and enrollment seems much
more a function of the physical presence of a local school rather than purposive
household investments in human capital accumulation. In focus group surveys,
respondents always stated that they considered education important, but they also
emphasized the substantial costs of sending their children to relatively far-off
secondary schools, and the uncertain returns given urban unemployment. In terms of
off-farm work, the results are not surprising given that Ethiopia has one of the lowest
rates of rural nonfarm employment in the world (see Headey, Taffesse, and You,
2014). However, future work should explore the relationship between off-farm
income and land constraints. Unfortunately, nonfarm income data were not measured
in the ﬁrst round of the AGPS.
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equipment.
Turning to Table 4.2, we ﬁrst examine EA wages with respect to
farm sizes. We ﬁnd a modest marginal effect that is signiﬁcant only
at the 11% level. However, village wages are associated with great-
er wealth in a village, as well as the presence of household heads
with tertiary education. In regression 2 we look at the use of hired
labor per hectare. We uncover a very small and marginally signif-
icant effect of 0.03 man-days per hectare. This weak effect proba-
bly represents some contradictory forces: Smaller farms need to
use land more intensively and may hire labor for that purpose,
but larger farms are not likely to have adequate family labor, and
hence they need to hire labor. Consistent with that inference, the
next regression shows that more land-constrained villages use
much more family labor per ha: about 40 man-days per hectare,
with an elasticity of 0.41. Farm size inequality bears a positive
relationship with family labor per hectare.
The last two regressions in Table 4.2 focus on yields of maize
and teff, the two most common crops in Ethiopia. We ﬁnd quite
large negative marginal effects of farm sizes on teff and maize
yields, with a 1 ha reduction in land area predicting teff yields to
increase by 335 kg on average, and maize yields to increase by
563 kg. In both cases the elasticity estimates are similar (0.53
and 0.54 respectively). Farm size inequality has some tendency
to raise yields but it is not signiﬁcant. Access to an extension ofﬁce
raises teff yields (which may be related to the promotion of im-
proved teff varieties in recent years through extension services).
Education has somewhat ambiguous effects, with secondary edu-
cation raising yields and tertiary education lowering yields.
Finally, Table 4.3 focuses on ﬁve indicators of more direct rel-
evance to household welfare. The ﬁrst two regressions focus on
two measures of net crop income per hectare. There are two
advantages to using total crop income. First, if intensiﬁcation in-
volves switching away from cereals to higher-value crops, thencrop income is a more relevant aggregate indicator than cereal
yields. Second, as we showed in Eq. (1) above, if farm sizes
shrink, then crop income per hectare must increase to compen-
sate for the loss of crop area.
In regression 1 of Table 4.3 we look at crop income net of all
variable costs, excluding labor. The coefﬁcient attached to average
farm sizes is very large, predicting that a onehectare reduction in
village farm size leads to a 4,216 birr (or US$250) increase in net
crop income per hectare, with a large elasticity of 0.54. However,
given the large impact of land constraints on family labor per hect-
are (Table 4.1), the addition of imputed family labor costs to other
variable input costs in regression 2 greatly reduces the linkage be-
tween land constraints and net crop income per hectare. The point
estimate falls from 4215 birr to 682 birr, although the latter coef-
ﬁcient is not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
In regressions 3 and 4 we focus on gross and net farm income
per capita, a variable we would expect to be strongly associated
with total income and poverty in rural Ethiopia, where nonfarm
incomes comprise a very small share of total income.16 Gross
farm income is signiﬁcantly associated with more land access,
Table 4.4
Results of a sensitivity test using the proportion of farms in a village (enumeration area) that are smaller than 1 hectare. Source: Authors’ calculations from AGPS data.









Farms smaller than 1 ha (0–1) 28.3*** 5.2*** 1,380.6*** 0.85*** 0.01
(5.2) (1.4) (213.1) (0.21) (0.14)
No. of villages (N) 265 266 261 270 269
R-squared 0.43 0.24 0.43 0.65 0.34
Small farms elasticity 0.87 2.01 1.05 1.31 N.A.




Teff yields (kg/ha) Maize yields (kg/ha)
Farms less than 1 ha (0–1) 4.95*** 0.08 125.4*** 1,049.1*** 1,720.0***
(1.86) (0.05) (15.9) (188.5) (295.2)
No. of villages (N) 267 267 266 267 267
R-squared 0.31 0.28 0.45 0.38 0.42
Farm size elasticity 0.09 0.54 0.69 0.69








Wealth index (std. dev.)
Farms smaller than 1 ha (0–1) 13,859.5*** 2,666.4 955.9** 1,790.4*** 0.38**
(1,914.2) (91,889.5) (375.3) (394.8) (0.18)
No. of villages (N) 268 267 268 268 268
R-squared 0.33 0.21 0.27 0.30 0.24
Farm size elasticity 0.75 0.05 0.61 0.09
Notes: The regressions also included all the control variables in Tables 4.1–4.3, as well as agroecological controls for altitude, length of the growing period, soil quality, and
slope. See Table 2.1 for deﬁnitions of variables and Headey et al. (2013) for full results.
 Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
Standard errors are in parenthesis. The farm size elasticity at the bottom of this table is calculated at the medians of the dependent and independent variables.
kg = kilogram; ha = hectare.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% levels.
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% levels.
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ticity of 0.09. However, as expected, land access has a much larger
impact on net farm income per capita (even after excluding family
labor), with a coefﬁcient of 1029 birr, or US$61, and an elasticity
of 0.84. In other words, a halving of farming area (that is, a reduc-
tion of 50%) is predicted to reduce net income per capita by 42%.
By this measure land access would therefore appear to be a major
determinant of welfare in rural Ethiopia.
In the last regression in Table 4.3, however, we observe only a
modest effect of land constraint on the wealth index. One explana-
tion of this may be that wealth indices perform quite poorly in
Ethiopia, where ownership of modern assets (vehicles, phones,
televisions) is extremely low, thus inhibiting variation in tangible
assets.
Sensitivity tests
In addition to seemingly unrelated regressions, we also esti-
mated the above models using a robust regressor to downweight
outliers, as well as non-parametric techniques (LOWESS estimates)
that not only downweight outliers but also allow us to test for
threshold effects. Our concern regarding potential outliers relates
to the possibility of measurement errors in land appearing in both
the dependent and independent variables, thereby creating some
potential for spurious correlations. Moreover, with a relatively
small sample (N varies from 265 to 288 villages depending on
the variable used), a few unusual villages (such as the few lowland
villages in the sample) could unduly inﬂuence results. However,
we found no substantial differences in the coefﬁcients derived with
robust regressor, nor any signs of non-linearities from the non-
parametric graphical estimators, so we do not report them here.
A more important sensitivity test is the use of an alternative
indicator of land pressures, the proportion of farms in a village that
are below 1 ha. This variable has several potential advantages.
First, it is generally argued that an average sized family with access
to a plow could harvest at least 2 ha. Smaller families with a plow
could perhaps feasibly harvest only somewhere between 1 and
2 ha. But except for the most labor- and power-constrainedhectares, any average family would certainly feel land constrained
if it could access only 1 ha or less. Such circumstances would obvi-
ously be strong motivations to intensify production.
A second reason to use this indicator is that it is less inﬂuenced
by the presence of a handful of large farms in a village. A few large
farms could substantially raise the village mean (which is why we
also measured the coefﬁcient of variation of farm sizes at the EA le-
vel), thereby giving the impression of little land constraints at the
village level even though most households in the village may be
unable to access more land. This would imply that the proportion
of small farms might be a more accurate indicator of the latent var-
iable of interest, land constraints. A scatterplot of the two indica-
tors provides some evidence of these kinds of outliers. Even so,
the correlation between the two indicators is reasonably high
(0.83), as one might expect.
With that in mind, Table 4.4 reports the coefﬁcients on this var-
iable from regressions that are otherwise the same. Here, the coef-
ﬁcients represent the marginal impact of going from a village with
no farms greater than 1 ha to a village in which all farms are great-
er than 1 ha. The results of these regressions are quite consistent
with those in Tables 4.1–4.3, but with a few minor differences.
We ﬁnd somewhat stronger results on the plow index (which de-
clines markedly as small farms become more prevalent), and
somewhat stronger results on daily wages. There is also some ten-
dency toward more precise estimates, which may well reﬂect the
fact that the prevalence of small farms is a better indicator of vil-
lage land pressures than average farm sizes. But all in all, the re-
sults reafﬁrm the basic narrative derived from our core result:
Signs of Boserupian intensiﬁcation are clear in the higher-potential
areas of Ethiopia, although this adaptation does not prevent land
constraints from playing a major role in reducing farm incomes
in these areas.
Conclusions
With its long history of food insecurity and famine, Ethiopia is
an insightful case study for testing the Malthusian and Boserupian
hypotheses, as well as the importance of policy-induced
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Ethiopia’s already small farm sizes have been declining quite rap-
idly and that young farmers cultivate substantially less land than
previous generations did. This stylized fact further emphasizes
the need for either successful agricultural intensiﬁcation or more
rapid migration out of agriculture.
On the positive side, we do ﬁnd strong support for Boserup’s
hypothesis, though some intensiﬁcation indicators are more
responsive than others. There is strong evidence that smaller farms
apply more fertilizer and other purchased inputs like improved
seeds, pesticides, and herbicides. Other inputs, such as the plow,
have more ambiguous relationships given their usefulness in
extending as well as intensifying land use. We also ﬁnd strong evi-
dence that family labor inputs per hectare increase substantially as
land pressures mount, though hired labor shows an opposing but
mild relationship. Also as expected, cereal yields are strongly and
positively associated with land pressures, as is gross farm income
per hectare (which incorporates higher-value crops) and farm in-
come net of purchased inputs. However, when the opportunity cost
of family labor is imputed with local wages, net farm income is
unresponsive to land pressures. Moreover, as one would expect,
we ﬁnd that land constraints are strongly linked to lower incomes,
especially net farm income per capita.
The results summarized above tell a story that is highly consis-
tent with Boserup; and much more so relative to previous work
testing the Boserupian hypothesis in Ethiopia (Pender et al.,
2006). Nevertheless, the results are not necessarily encouraging
in terms of the welfare implications of emerging land constraints.
Under fairly crude assumptions, the UN expects Ethiopia’s rural
population to increase from 69 million people in 2010 to 90 million
in 2030. The bulk of these 20 million extra people will be born in
the land-constrained highlands. With limited potential for irriga-
tion, low to moderate potential for smallholder land expansion into
the lowlands, and the seemingly inevitable prospect of smaller
farms getting even smaller, Ethiopia will require a mix of more suc-
cessful agricultural intensiﬁcation and much more rapid diversiﬁ-
cation out of smallholder farming.
How can this dual transformation be achieved? In terms of agri-
cultural intensiﬁcation, a range of research identiﬁes important
bottlenecks in the agricultural supply chain, particularly for seeds
and fertilizers (Byerlee and Spielman, 2007). Less widely re-
searched are the supply chains for other labor-substituting inputs,
such as pesticides, herbicides, and tractors. These inputs may well
be increasingly important both for land expansion (where possible)
and land intensiﬁcation, especially if family sizes continue to re-
duce. Also somewhat neglected in the policy and research dis-
course in Ethiopia are higher-value crops. There are two issues
here: increasing productivity and proﬁtability for existing cash
crop producers (for example, the large coffee sector), and encour-
aging small farmers currently focusing on staple crops to experi-
ment more in the high-value sector, including nontraditional
high-value crops. The growth of urban areas and improvement in
transport and value chains will further facilitate this transition.
What about off-farm diversiﬁcation? In more land-abundant
areas, the last decade has seen a shift in emphasis from small-
holder resettlement to large commercial farms, which may create
sizable opportunities for seasonal employment. In some focus
group discussions we found that seasonal employment in commer-
cial farms in Awash and northwest Ethiopia has been a very impor-
tant source of income diversiﬁcation for land-constrained areas,
but to our knowledge this has not been researched or quantiﬁed
in the Ethiopian context.
In terms of nonfarm diversiﬁcation, Ethiopia’s industrial sector
has long underperformed, but has sizable potential, given a large
and growing economy. Nevertheless, the unusually small size of
the rural nonfarm economy remains a puzzle, though small townsin Ethiopia are growing rapidly. The government has also ex-
panded education quite rapidly, but secondary education enroll-
ment has thus far increased only sluggishly in rural areas, and
job creation for the newly educated class has been rather slow.
Nevertheless, with very limited opportunities for land expansion
in the highlands, education will surely be a critical investment in
coming decades.
There are also long-standing perceptions that government reg-
ulations, the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) and land tenure
institutions indirectly discourage rural–urban migration. These
hypotheses warrant further research, though it is worth noting that
the Ethiopian government has also invested substantially in urban
infrastructure, including electricity, social services, and even public
housing. Thus the net effects of the government’s development
strategy on rural–urban transformation is ambiguous, though in
our view a rapid transformation should be unambiguously
encouraged.
Finally, the government of Ethiopia has long recognized that
slowing down rural population growth is a very desirable long-
term objective in such a land- and water-constrained country. On
this front some recent evidence suggests that government fam-
ily-planning policies—particularly the health extension worker
program—have been quite effective at reducing fertility rates (Pört-
ner et al., 2012). The evidence also suggests that expanding female
secondary education and rural–urban migration would be effective
in reducing fertility rates, in addition to family-planning policies.
These considerations reemphasize the fact that land constraints
are a multifaceted problem requiring a range of solutions. On the
positive front, the government has been quite cognizant of the
importance of land constraints. The issue is therefore not one of
neglect but is whether the design and implementation of strategies
for economic transformation can be further improved. This would
seem a critical area for future research.Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2014.01.
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